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STATEMENT OF THE CASE'

I.

Nature of the Case

This action was brought by the Appellants seeking to eliminate an easement over
the southeast corner of Lot 7 in Block 1 of Glassford Heights Subdivision. The easement
at issue is attached as Exhibit "1" to Respondent Ms. Wescott's Warranty Deed and
states:
Exhibit "1"
105 Jones Lane
This Warranty Deed shall include a temporary 25 foot wide Easement of
Access. (See plat map - Exhibit 2) over the Southeast comer of Lot 7 of
Block 1 of the Glassford Heights Sub for access to Lot 8 of the Glassford
Heights Sub. When/if Blaine county and the United States Forest Service
provide a permanent access across USFS Lands to Lot 8, the owner of Lot
shall Quitclaim the Easement of Access back to Lot 7 within 30 days of
written receipt thereof.
This Easement of Access shall become "In Effect" only upon receipt by
the owner (of Lot 8) of written denial by the USFS for the owner (of Lot
8) to access Lot 8 across USFS lands on the East side of the property line
(of Lot 8) and beginning at Bench Road. This Easement of Access shall
remain "In Effect" only until Blaine County agrees to allow access to Lot
8 from Jones Lane. The owner's of Lot 8 shall Quitclaim the Easement of
Access back to Lot 7 within one year or upon completion of the driveway,
whichever occurs first.
R. Vol. I, p. 13 (hereafter referred to as "Easement of Access"). A true and correct copy

of Ms. Wescott's Warranty Deed is included herewith as Addendum A.
The Easement of Access can be separated into two distinct clauses: Paragraph 1
and Paragraph 2. Paragraph 1 contains an express condition precedent, which is the
acquisition of "permanent access" from either Blaine County or the United States Forest
Service ("USFS") across USFS Lands to Lot 8.

Within thirty days after receiving

"permanent access" Lot 8 must quitclaim the Easement of Access back to Lot 7. It was,
and remains, undisputed that Ms. Wescott has not received "permanent access", so no
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duty has ansen under Paragraph 1. Appellant knew pnor to filing suit that no
"permanent" access had ever been granted to Ms. Wescott across USFS lands.
Paragraph 2 of the Easement of Access describes when the Easement of Access
becomes effective, or like a light bulb, turned on. Until the owner of Lot 8 receives a
written denial from the USFS, the Easement of Access is not effective, or is off.
However, upon receipt of a written denial, the Easement of Access is turned on. Once
on, the owner of Lot 8 may then access the property across the Easement of Access until
Blaine County agrees to allow access to Lot 8 from Jones Lane. After the completion of
a driveway from Jones Lane to Lot 8, Lot 8 must then quitclaim the Easement of Access
to Lot 7.
Appellants brought this action alleging (1) Respondent had abandoned the
easement; (2) the 2007 USFS Easement obtained by Respondent was near permanent;
and (3) the easement at issue was never "in effect," and therefore had somehow expired.
The Appellants subsequently sought to amend the Complaint on the basis the owners of
Lot 9, the Woodcocks, had obtained a USFS Easement in 2000 which was "permanent"
and Ms. Wescott was an unnamed beneficiary of the 2000 Woodcock Easement. As
shown below, the District Court rejected each of Appellants' arguments.
Appellants' arguments below, and on appeal, intentionally choose to disregard the
explicit terms of the Easement of Access, specifically the condition precedent to the
Easement of Access coming into effect (i.e. the second paragraph) and the requirement
for "permanent" access from either Blaine County or the USFS.
Appellants' suggestion that this Court focus and interpret only portions of the
second paragraph of the Easement of Access failed below, and the District Court
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correctly granted summary judgment to Defendant. The District Court found the USFS
"has not provided permanent access, that Blaine County is no longer in a position to
provide any access, they cannot fulfill - one of those, that other condition cannot be
fulfilled, and there has been no abandonment of the easement."

Court's Rulings &

Remarks on Summary Judgment Motions, 20:15-22 (March 30, 2014).

II.

Course of Proceedings

Appellants correctly recite the Course of Proceedings to the point of the Summary
Judgment. Appellant have chosen to cite only six small portions of the District Court's
Rulings and Remarks on Summary Judgment Motions, which argument was held on
March 31, 2014. The entire oral ruling consists of 24 pages of comments by the District
Court.

The District Court found, as a matter of law, the USFS had not provided a

permanent access across the USFS Lands, Blaine County cannot provide access to Ms.
Wescott's property from Jones Lane, and there had been no abandonment of the
Easement of Access.

Court's Rulings & Remarks on Summary Judgment Motions,

20:15-22 (March 30, 2014).
After the grant of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and denial of
Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, on April 18, 2014 the Appellants filed a
Motion to Amend Complaint based upon a separate easement granted by the USFS in
August of 2000 to Douglas and Charlotte Woodcock (hereafter the "Woodcock
Easement").
Appellants argued below the Woodcock Easement, though it references only

Douglas and Charlotte Woodcock as the Grantee, also applies to Ms. Wescott because
the title attached to the legal description, which was prepared by Galena Engineering,
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Inc., states "PROPERTY DESCRIPTION

A 33' WIDE EASEMENT TO ACCESS

LOTS 8 & 9, GLASSFORD HEIGHTS SUBDIVISION." R. Vol. I, p. 20.
The Appellants argued below, as here, that the Woodcock Easement satisfied the
issue of permanent access to Ms. Wescott's property.

The pertinent portion of the

Woodcock Easement for the Appellants, and the only section focused on by the
Appellants states "[t]his easement shall continue for as long as the property served is used
for a single family residence." R. Vol. I, p. 121. The Woodcock Easement contains an
unambiguous and expressly stated expiration date of December 31, 2029, which is
completely disregarded by the Appellants. Id
Respondent opposed Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint on April 28, 2014.
Respondent retained the services of Andrew Hawes, an expert witness, who opined the
Woodcock Easement: (i) contains an expiration date; (ii) does not run with the land of
Lot 8 of Glassford Heights Subdivision and is solely personal to the stated Grantees,
Douglas and Charlotte Woodcock; and (iii) is subject to defeasement for a multitude of
reasons.
Just pnor to the hearing on May 5, 2014, the Appellants filed the Second
Affidavit of Richard W. Mollerup, which states, among other things, his opinion is the
Woodcock Easement "is a permanent easement benefiting or serving property including
Lot 8 ... It does not appear to me that the words "Expiration Date: 12/31/2029" at the top
left corner are part of the easement granted ... but an internal filing reference in which the
expiration date was included in error. That expiration date is in direct conflict with
Paragraph D of the [Woodcock Easement]." R. Vol. I., pp. 165-168.
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On May 5, 2014 the District Court heard oral arguments. The District Court ruled
from the bench. In the transcribed 20 page oral ruling the District Court found, among
other things, the intent of the applicants for the Woodcock Easement does not matter, but
rather, what the USFS actually did in granting an easement solely to the Woodcocks was
critical to the legal analysis. Thereafter, the District Court entered its Order denying
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend. R. Vol. I, p. 174. A trial was set for July 23, 2014, limited
to the issue of equities.
On July 14, 2014, the Appellants renewed their motion to amend complaint,
asking the Court to consider the intent of the Woodcock Easement. The basis for their
renewed motion was a disclosure of 109 pages of documents by Respondent. Appellants
contended below, as they do here, the documents disclosed were important so the District
Court could consider what the intent of the Woodcock Easement was. The Court denied
the Appellants' renewed motion on July 23, 2014, consistent with the Court's legal
analysis set forth in the transcript of the May 5, 2014 hearing and the March 31, 2014
hearing. The Court conducted a trial limited to the equities. The District Court entered
Judgment for the Respondent on August 25, 2014. This appeal was then taken.

III.

Statement of Facts

In 1997, Leif Odmark owned Lots 7 and 8 which were undeveloped. R. Vol. I, p.
138-139. The Woodcocks owned the adjacent Lot 9. R. Vol. I, p. 140. The address of
Lot 8, the property subject to this litigation, was 105 Jones Lane. R. Vol. I, p. 13.
On July 14, 1998, the Woodcocks submitted a Special-Use Application and
Report to the USFS requesting "a permanent easement for all-year residential purposes,
including utilities and access, for Glassford Heights Subdivision, Lot 9, from the existing
Bench Road, a public road maintained by Blaine County." R. Vol. I, p. 130.
-5-

On the same day, July 14, 1998, Mr. Odmark wrote to Mr. Nelson, the Regional
Forester, expressing his support for a permanent easement to be issued to the Woodcocks.
R. Vol. I, p. 234.

On August 11, 1998 Linda S. Haavik, the Administrator for the Blaine County
Planning and Zoning Building Department, wrote to Mr. Kurt Nelson, the Regional
Forester, expressing support for the access easement to Lot 9 over USFS land. R. Vol. I,
p. 141. Ms. Havvik also expressed the need for a driveway to be constructed from Jones
Lane across wetlands. Id She further expressed concerns over the safety of access to
Lot 9 from Jones Lane should a driveway be required to be installed. Id. She went on to
express concern regarding access to Lot 8, stating "I have a concern over future access to
the adjacent Lot 8, which the Woodcock's do not own. I believe that access to Lot 8
should be allowed from the same easement that the Woodcock's are requesting if it is
indeed improved." Id Since the Woodcock Easement had not been granted, the USFS
had a concern over the trespass occurring over its property for access to Lots 8 and 9. Id
While the Special Use Application and Report was pending before the USFS, Ms.
Wescott and her former spouse purchased the property on April 14, 2000. R. Vol. I, pp.
12-15. The Warranty Deed references the address of 105 Jones Lane, as platted access to
Lot 8 was to be from Jones Lane off of State Highway 75. Id.
Four months later, on August 3, 2000, recorded on August 15, 2000, the USFS
granted a Forest Road Easement to Douglas and Charlotte Woodcock, the only grantees
of the instrument. R. Vol. I, p. 121. The Woodcock Easement includes an expiration
date on the first page of the easement of December 31, 2029.

Id.

In addition the

Woodcock Easement references only a single property by stating "[t]his easement shall
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continue for as long as the property served is used for a single family residence." Id. The
Woodcock Easement Exhibit "A" references, in the title only, as "A 33' WIDE
EASEMENT TO ACCESS LOTS 8 & 9." R. Vol. I, p. 125.
Ms. Wescott and her former spouse developed Lot 8, built a home and
constructed a driveway which was accessed via the Woodcock Easement. R. Vol. I, pp.
60-70. During construction, Ms. Wescott also accessed her property from Jones Lane.

Id. at 62. After Ms. Wescott's title company notified her she had no legal access to her
property, Ms. Wescott obtained an easement from the USFS. Id. at 63.
On May 15, 2007, recorded on May 22, 2007, the USFS granted a Forest Road
Easement to Ann B. Wescott which included "a nonexclusive easement for use of a road"
to access "Lot 8 of Block 1, Glassford Heights Subdivision" (hereafter the "Wescott
Easement"). R. Vol. I, p. 16. The Wescott Easement states "[t]his easement shall expire
on 12/31/2036." Id.
On October 17, 2007, Michael Capener then owner of Lot 7, submitted an
application to Blaine County for the vacation of Jones Lane. R. Vol. I, p. 235. Jones
Lane was platted to serve as access to Lots 8 and 9. R. Vol. I, p. 237.
The Appellants acquired title to Lot 7 on or about January 11, 2010. R. Vol. I, p.
10. Sometime after the purchase of Lot 7, the Appellants became aware of Ms. Wescott's
easement, and brought this action to quiet title to their property.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
Respondent raises the following additional issues on appeal:
1.

Whether the District Court erred by failing to find the Appellants' claims

were pursued frivolously and without factual foundation, and whether the District Court
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erred by failing to award Respondent attorney's fees based upon the frivolous nature of
the Appellant's claims.
2.

Whether the Appellants' appeal is frivolous and without legal or factual

foundation.
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL

Respondent respectfully requests an award of costs and attorney's fees on appeal
pursuant to LC. §12-121.
ARGUMENT

I.

The District Court's Grant of Summary Judgment Was Appropriate.
a.

Standard of Review.

The standard of review of a lower court's grant of summary judgment is as
follows:
When reviewing a ruling on a summary judgment motion, this Court
applies the same standard used by the district court. Cristo Viene
Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304,307, 160 P.3d 743, 746 (2007).
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c).
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
is on the moving party. Hayward v. Jack's Pharmacy, Inc., 141 Idaho 622,
625, 115 P.3d 713, 716 (2005). However, if the nonmoving party fails to
provide a sufficient showing to establish the essential elements of his or
her case, judgment shall be granted to the moving party. Atwood v. Smith,
143 Idaho 110, 113, 138 P.3d 310, 313 (2006). This Court will liberally
construe all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party, and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record will be drawn in
favor of the nonmoving party. Cristo Viene, 144 Idaho at 307, 160 P.3d at
746. Summary judgment is improper "if reasonable persons could reach
differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence
presented." McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 394, 64 P.3d 317, 320
(2003).
Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 402-03, 195 P.3d 1212, 1215-16 (2008).
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Both the Appellants and the Respondent moved for summary judgment. The
Appellants moved for Summary Judgment on the basis that (i) the Easement of Access
never came into effect, (ii) the Easement of Access, if it came into effect, expired under
its express terms, and (iii) Wescott abandoned the Easement of Access.
Ms. Wescott moved for summary judgment on the basis that (i) the Wescott
Easement from the USFS to Ms. Wescott is not permanent and (ii) Blaine County can no
longer provide access to Lot 8 via Jones Lane.
The parties fully briefed the motions, and a hearing was held on March 31, 2014.
The pure legal issues framed in the summary judgment motions were: 1) whether Ms.
Wescott's 2007 Easement from the USFS was "permanent;" and 2) whether Ms. Wescott
had abandoned the Easement of Access by non-use. The Appellants were unable to
establish the essential legal elements of their case and the Court appropriately granted
summary judgment to Ms. Wescott.

b.

The District Court Never Found the Easement of Access Was
Ambiguous and Interpreted the Easement of Access in Accord
with Applicable Law.

As admitted by the Appellants, the District Court never made an express finding
that the Easement of Access was ambiguous. In fact Appellants admitted to the District
Court that the "case is ripe for entry of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs for the
reason that the document is clear and unambiguous." R. Vol. I, pp. 109-110. Appellants
are judicially estopped from taking a contrary position.
"Judicial estoppel takes into account ... what the [estopped] party knew, or should
have known, at the time the original position was adopted. Thus, the knowledge that the
party possesses, or should have possessed, at the time the statement is made is
determinative as to whether that person is 'playing fast and loose' with the court. Judicial
-9-

estoppel, however, should "only be applied when the party maintaining the inconsistent
position either did have, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the attendant facts
prior to adopting the initial position." McCallister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891, 895, 303 P.3d
578, 582 (2013) (internal citations omitted).
Here, it is unequivocal that Appellants read, fully understood, and represented to
the District Court that the Easement of Access was unambiguous, and thus "ripe for entry
of summary judgment." The District Court, in fact, interpreted the Easement of Access
as a matter of law, with the plain language of the document, and without extrinsic
evidence.
The "[i]nterpretation of an ambiguous document presents a question of fact. On
the other hand, interpretation of an unambiguous document is a question of law.
Determination of whether a document is ambiguous is itself a question of law."

Delancey v. Delancey, 110 Idaho 63, 714 P.2d 32 (1986) (internal citations omitted).
While the District Court stated: "I don't think I can look at any particular line and
say this is clear and unambiguous and therefore this yields a clear result," the District
Court never made an express finding that the Easement of Access was ambiguous.
Transcript Court's Rulings & Remarks on Summary Judgment Motions, March 31, 2014,
p. 2. L. 9-16. To determine whether a document is ambiguous, the Court must determine
whether the document is "reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation." Delancey v.

Delancey, 110 Idaho 63,714 P.2d 32 (1986).
Appellants fault the District Court for not finding the Easement of Access
ambiguous, however simply because the Appellants and the Respondent differ on the
interpretation, does not make the Easement of Access ambiguous. Jasso v. Camas Cnty.,
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151 Idaho 790,264 P.3d 897 (2011) ("However, ambiguity is not present merely because
the parties present differing interpretations to the court."). The District Court recognized
that in order to determine whether the Easement of Access was ambiguous, the Easement
of Access must be construed in its entirety. Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 65 P.3d 525
(2003).
The Appellants contend the District Court failed to consider the Easement of
Access in its entirety and failed to consider what the intent of the parties were as
demonstrated by extrinsic evidence. Appellants' argument is incorrect and not supported
by the record. The record clearly indicates the District Court reviewed the Easement of
Access and determined as a matter of law what the intention of the parties was
ascertainable from the Easement of Access' plain language, without the aid of extrinsic
evidence. See Hoch v. Vance, 155 Idaho 636,315 P.3d 824 (2013). The District Court,
in its review of the Easement of Access stated:
The first -- well, the second sentence of the first paragraph, "When/If
Blaine County and the United States Forest Service provide a permanent
access across US Forest Service land to Lot 8," then there is a requirement
that the owner shall quitclaim the easement back to Lot 7 within 30 days.
And there are two conditions there. That is Blaine County has to act and
the United States Forest Service has to act in order to fulfill those
conditions and that triggers a 30-day requirement of the easement be
handed back. If it stopped there, we wouldn't have any trouble.
Then the easement goes on to say that this easement of access shall
become in effect upon one condition, and that it shall remain in effect
upon another condition. And that second one is until Blaine County
agrees to allow access to Lot 8. The becoming in effect is triggered by the
forest service denying access. Until then there is no easement.
Court's Rulings & Remarks on Summary Judgment Motions, 2: 17-3: 10 (March 31,
2014).

The District Court continued its review of the Easement of Access and

determined as a matter oflaw Ms. Wescott's 2007 Easement was not permanent nor had
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the USFS provided permanent access. Id at 3: 11-14, 4:3-4. The District Court further
determined as a matter of law Blaine County could be of no assistance in providing
permanent access to Ms. Wescott's property given Blaine County's vacation of Jones
Lane. Id at 4:5-8.
The Court then reviewed the second paragraph of the Easement of Access further,
stating "[t]his argument, the rest of this argument about whether it came into existence,
came into effect, I think is trying to determine what paragraph two means." Id at 4: 135 :3. The District Court ruled, as a matter of law, that Ms. Wescott had not abandoned the
Easement of Access. Id at 5:4-6:23. The Appellants' assertion that the non-use of the
Easement of Access was abandonment was rejected by the District Court.
The District Court interpreted the intent of the Easement of Access as follows:
Lot 8, excuse me, yes. Would be landlocked if access was not granted
across Lot 7 to get to Bench Road. And my point is they recognized that
problem and knew something had to be done about it and the something
that had to be done about it was the creation of this easement. And it says,
okay, if the forest service closes you off and you can't get a workable
access to your lot from Blaine County, then you're going to have this
easement. That to me is the overall and overriding intent of the easement
The next question is, was it -- could it have a, I don't know, a yo-yo effect,
a pull back, a string attached, a I'm just kidding? Could it mean that? I
tend to agree with Mr. Trout. He said you can't -- when he said you can't
ascribe a fraudulent intent to Mr. Odmark, or an illusory intent, I guess,
might be another way to look at this, I have a tremendous amount of
difficulty saying this easement is intended to be -- illusory is not the right
word, but that's one that comes to mind -- by saying, here, you've got an
easement if either of these two things happen, but just kidding, it all comes
back in a year no matter what. Because the contemplation of the parties
were that the forest service might or might not grant permanent access.
Blaine County might or might not act.
And it's very difficult for me to believe that the county is going to allow
development of these two lots by taking a look at the language of this
easement and saying, well, you really didn't give it any easement or you
didn't give Lot 8 an easement when it appears that's what you did. We're
going to let you develop these lots. Sure, you've provided for somebody
-12-

not being landlocked in the future, but then they get to come back and
point to this provision and say, well, we fooled the county and you. We
get that easement back within a year no matter what. I really have trouble
reaching the conclusion that the easement was intended to come back
within a year no matter what, or completion of the driveway.
The only intent that I can ascribe to that is that if something didn't happen
within a year, or excuse me, if something did happen, then within a year
of that event, within a year of permanent access being granted by the
forest service, or upon completion of the driveway, perhaps through Jones
Lane, and I know that I am adding words that are not there in order to
come up with these possible explanations, but to me that's the only thing
that language could mean.
Id at 7:1- 8:24.

After reviewing the Easement of Access in its entirety, the District Court: (i) did
not determine the Easement of Access was ambiguous; (ii) interpreted the Easement of
Access with the circumstances in existence at the time the Easement of Access was
granted; and (iii) without considering extrinsic evidence, determined the intention of the
parties as a matter oflaw ascertained from the Easement of Access' plain language.
The District Court's grant of summary judgment to Respondent was legally
correct, and supported by applicable law.
c.

The Appellants' Contention that the District Court Should
Consider Additional Documents is Improper.

The Appellants argue the District Court failed to consider the circumstances
existing at the time the Easement of Access was drafted. In support of this argument, the
Appellants point to documents that predate the grant of the Easement of Access.
Appellants argue the District Court should have considered: (i) the Special Use Permit
Application, Appellants' Trial Exhibit No. 1; (ii) the Blaine County letter to the USFS,
Appellants' Trial Exhibit No. 2; (iii) Odmark's letter to the USFS, Appellants' Trial
Exhibit No. 6; (iv) the USFS News Release, Appellants' Trial Exhibit No. 8; (v) the
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Woodcock Easement, Appellants' Trial Exhibit No. 4, and; (vi) the Staff Report to the
Blaine County Board of Commissioners, Appellants' Trial Exhibit No. 7.
As discussed above, the District Court did not find the Easement of Access was
ambiguous. Had it done so, the District Court could have looked to extrinsic evidence,
however the District Court determined the intent of the parties as a matter of law from the
plain language of the Easement of Access. These documents have no bearing on the
single document subject to interpretation in this matter, the Easement of Access.
Furthermore, these documents were not before the Court at the Summary
Judgment hearing and weren't before the Court until Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend
Complaint filed on April 18, 2014. R. Vol. I, pp. 111-125, 130-142. The Appellants
never filed a motion for reconsideration asking the Court to reconsider its ruling.
The District Court's ruling on Summary Judgment was appropriate and was
based, in part, on the representation of counsel for both parties advising the Court that no
better factual decision could be made if a trial was held. The District Court stated:
Part of this is the parties' suggestion that I'm not going to get to any better
decision if we have a trial. Counsel seem to agree on that. I was really
prepared when I came in here to say go find some more evidence of intent,
but I think both counsel are saying we can't.
Court's Rulings & Remarks on Summary Judgment Motions, 6:10-15 (March 31, 2015).
The District Court considered the evidence before it, determined there was no
genuine issue of material fact and determined the intent of the parties as a matter of law
and without extrinsic evidence.
As will be addressed more fully below, even if the District Court had considered
the documents Appellant later brought to the District Court's attention and now argues
should have been considered, the District Court would have come to the same conclusion
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and granted summary judgment to Respondent. As discussed below the District Court
did come to the same conclusion after the Appellants filed their Motion to Amend
Complaint on April 16, 2014.
II.

The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Plaintiffs'
Motions to Amend Complaint, Nor Did the District Court Abuse its
Discretion by Excluding Evidence Purportedly of the Intent of the
Temporary Easement.

Rule 15(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any
time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been
placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so amend it at any time
within twenty (20) days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend a
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party;
and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires, and the court may
make such order for the payment of costs as it deems proper. A party shall
plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for
response to the original pleading or within ten (10) days after service of
the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the
court otherwise orders.
I.R.C.P. 15(a). "A court's decision to allow the amendment of pleadings is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. When determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion,
this Court asks: (1) whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) whether it acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion and consistently with
any applicable legal standards; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise of
reason." Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 345, 33 P.3d 816, 819
(2001).
The Supreme Court in Carl H Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133
Idaho 866, 993 P.2d 1197 (1999) stated "[t]he twin purposes behind the rule are to allow
claims to be determined on the merits rather than on technicalities, and to make pleadings
serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of the claim and the facts at issue.
-15-

It is within the district court's sound discretion to decide whether to allow a party to

amend its complaint after a responsive pleading has been served. [I]n the interest of
justice, district courts should favor liberal grants of leave to amend a complaint." Carl H

Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 13 3 Idaho 866, 993 P.2d 1197 ( 1999) (Internal
citations omitted).
The Idaho Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in
interpreting the comparable federal rule, stating:
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay,
bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to
cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to
the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of
amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely
given

Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 346, 33 P.3d 816, 820
(2001) (citing Carl H Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866,
993 P.2d 1197 (1999)).
Appellants filed their Motions to Amend Complaint on the basis of the discovery
of allegedly new evidence. The "new evidence" was more than fifteen years old at the
point of Appellants' Motion to Amend. All of the allegedly "new evidence" was available
to Appellants before and since the institution of this suit. All of the allegedly "new
evidence" was part of the public records of either the USFS or Blaine County.
Appellants, in essence, argue that the District Court wrongly denied their Motion
to Amend Complaint and that the District Court should have considered these documents
to interpret the Easement of Access. However, as discussed above, it is evident the
District Court did not find the Easement of Access was ambiguous. In fact, the District
Court determined the intent of the parties as a matter of law as ascertained from the
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Easement of Access' plain language without the aid of extrinsic evidence.

Hoch v.

Vance, 155 Idaho 636,315 P.3d 824 (2013).

It would have been inappropriate for the District Court to consider extrinsic
evidence given the findings made on summary judgment - all of which were made as a
matter of law.

a.

Appellants' April 2014 Motion to Amend Complaint.

Appellants' April 2014 Motion to Amend cited to the allegedly "new evidence"
which included the Woodcock Easement, the Special Use Application and Report, and an
August 11, 1998 letter from Blaine County to the USFS. R. Vol. I, pp. 121-125, 130-142.
Appellant alleged Ms. Wescott was an intended beneficiary under the Woodcock
Easement. R. Vol. I, pp. 126-129. Respondent objected to the motion to amend on the
grounds that the documents relied upon by the Appellants were never incorporated into
the Woodcock Easement and the Woodcock Easement was not permanent. R. Vol. I., pp.
149-151.
At oral argument, on May 5, 2015, the District Court considered each of the
documents attached to the proposed Amended Complaint.

In denying Appellants'

Motion to Amend Complaint, the District Court appropriately noted the only grantee to
the Woodcock easement were Douglas and Charlotte Woodcock; Ms. Wescott was not a
named beneficiary; and the intent surrounding the Woodcock Easement did not matter,
but what mattered is what the USFS actually granted. Transcript of Court's Rulings and
Remarks, 4:23- 6:2 (May 5, 2014).
The District Court also concluded the Woodcock Easement was not permanent,
on the basis that it allowed for the rights granted under the Woodcock Easement to be
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assigned or transferred. Id. at 6:25-7: 18. The District Court stated such language would
not be required if the Woodcock Easement was permanent. Id.
The District Court clearly perceived the granting of the Motion to Amend as one
of discretion, acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion, and reached its decision
by an exercise of reason. The District Court's oral rulings on May 5, 2014, clearly
demonstrate the District Court considered each of Appellants' arguments and determined
such an amendment would be futile.
The District Court stated:
The only grantee of the [the Woodcock Easement], we'll call it an
easement, the Exhibit B to the amended complaint, Instrument 442116,
and I'll try and refer to this as Exhibit B to the amended complaint, the
only grantee is Woodcocks. Ms. Wescott is not a grantee. She's not a
named beneficiary. That's problem one. So, at best, she has an argument
that I am an intended beneficiary and I have the right to enforce this
easement as against someone else if push comes to shove. That someone
else is going to be the United States ....
And the third part of that is the Forest Service and/or the United States is
not a party to this, so whatever evidence we gather of Woodcocks' intent
and the government's intent as expressed to Blaine County or the intent
that might be gleaned from the parties and Mr. Manwaring saying we can
present evidence of all these people's intent, that matters not. What
matters is what the government did and what they put in the deed.
And I can take evidence for weeks on what everybody intended and what
they wanted to do, and this case can wind up in federal court in 10 or 15 or
20 or 30 or 50 years, and a federal judge can take a real good look at this
and say it was nice of Judge Elgee to look at this problem and try and
solve it for Ms. Wescott, but the government, the United States
government, wasn't a party, didn't appear, and the Judge is trying to read
between the lines -- Judge Elgee was trying to read between the lines and
come up with what everybody intended. Nice try. I have a different
opinion. The government has title to this property and is free to do
what they want with it. The government retains the right to cancel the
easement, it expires, whatever.
That brings up a couple other points. Even on its face, if I -- if I heard
additional evidence, the [Woodcock Easement] says it expires. And we
can argue about what that means, and I can come up with my conclusions
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about what that means and, like I say, the federal government 20 years
from now in a federal court, a different judge might have a different
opinion, and that's what's going to control.
The deed also says that it is to the Woodcocks for a length of time. It
does not say that it's permanent. It does not say that it runs with the
land. And Mr. Manwaring, when he points to Part C of that, it says, "The
rights granted under this easement can be transferred or assigned ... ," and I
want to underline those words, "can be transferred or assigned," means
that someone later can do something different, but it isn't done
permanently now, and it would have to be done in the future by someone
who is an owner. They may transfer or assign. That language would
not be necessary if the easement was permanent and ran with the
land. I know enough about easements to know that. We wouldn't have
to be here arguing about whether it ran with the land.
My point is, is that it's a question when it expires. It's a question whether
it's permanent so long as it's used -- it says so long as it's used for a
personal residence. To me, that's not permanent. You can argue that it is.
But if I quieted title, I would be leaving Ms. Wescott with another
question. If I said it doesn't expire, that's a maybe, also. If I said it runs
with the land, that's a maybe, also. If I concluded that Blaine County's
intent mattered or that the Forest Service's intent mattered outside the
terms of this deed that is proposed, Exhibit B, or this grant of easement,
this 442116, if I go outside of that easement and say here's what the
parties intended and this was what got done and this was what was coming
down the pike, no matter what I do here, I am simply switching the
question from a cloud on Mr. Manwaring's client's title to switching
and leaving questions and clouds on the title of Ms. Wescott and
saying, well, you've got an easement, good luck, the problem is now
yours. You've got some sort of easement from the United States, nobody
is sure whether it's going to expire, nobody is sure what this 33 feet refers
to, nobody is sure if it includes you in the reference, whether you're a
direct beneficiary or an intended sidecar beneficiary or whether you just
merely seem to benefit from it, but it can't be enforced in your name. It
certainly can't be enforced against the government by Ms. Wescott,
because the government is not a party. ...
There are more questions that I could probably resolve and come up
with answers about, but I don't have the authority over the United
States to say this is what they intended, this is what they did, and I get
to bind them to anything. That's the first and foremost problem.
But these other problems or issues simply point up that there is nothing
definite here with regard to the easement that -- this Exhibit B that the
government gave. It is not permanent, and if it's argued that it is, that's, at
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best, questionable. Who it runs to, whether it runs with the land, those are,
at best, questions. Woodcocks' intent, Blaine County's intent, those aren't
going to bind the government.
So, for all those reasons -- and let me see if there are any other ones
that I want to address -- I don't think granting the amended
complaint and hearing more evidence solves the problem. That's really
the long and short of it. ...

The motion to vacate the trial is based on new evidence and an amended
complaint. I cannot see that filing the amended complaint is going to help.
The case was held open to see if Mr. Manwaring could solve the
problem -- or when I say the case was left open, I said in my
discussion -- I went back and read the transcript from March 31st,
and what I think I wanted to leave open were two things. One, can
Mr. Manwaring go to the Forest Service and actually get something
that is permanent and that unquestionably solves the problem. And
Mr. Manwaring is saying, Judge, I'll represent to you that's a
possibility. And I don't want to foreclose that if it is a possibility . ...
So I'll deny the motion to file the amended complaint. I will leave open - and this is what I left open before and I didn't know how you wanted to
resolve it. or whether there's any reason to have a trial.
Transcript of Court's Rulings and Remarks, May 5, 2014, pp. 4-10, 12-15
(emphasis added).
"The Court reviews the process the district court used to reach its decision rather
than the decision itself. [W]here the trial court has exercised such discretion after a
careful consideration of the relevant factual circumstances and principles of law, and
without arbitrary disregard for those facts and principles of justice, [the Court] will not
disturb that action. Because this is a process oriented review, if a district court fails to
enumerate its reasons for a discretionary decision, and the reasons are not obvious from
the record, the Court will remand the case." DAFCO LLC v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 156
Idaho 749,756,331 P.3d 491,498 (2014) (internal citations omitted).
As the foregoing recitation of the record reveals, the District Court fully
enumerated its reasons for its discretionary decision and amply demonstrated the futility
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of the amendment. Appellants simply sought to replace the USFS Wescott Easement
with the Woodcock Easement in the Complaint. The District Court correctly concluded
this exchange of evidence and allegations would be futile because the Woodcock
Easement "does not say that it's permanent."

Transcript of Court's Rulings and

Remarks, May 5, 2014, 7:1.
For the same reason, the District Court correctly denied Appellants' Motion to
Amend because the claim that the Woodcock Easement was "permanent" was expressly
invalid, as a matter of law. The District Court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason, acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion, and perceived the issue as one
of discretion.
b.

Appellants' Renewed Motion to Amend Complaint

Two weeks prior to trial, Respondent provided 100 pages of documents to the
Appellant, which were not relevant to the equitable issues to be tried and were public
record. The Appellant immediately renewed its Motion to Amend the Complaint on the
basis that two documents provided additional evidence of the intent of the parties to the
Easement of Access.

The two additional documents were a hearsay letter from Mr.

Odmark to the USFS dated the same date as the application by the Woodcocks to the
USFS and a hearsay Staff Report to Blaine County Board of Commissioners. R. Vol. I,
pp. 216-245, 261-263. Both documents were part of the public record of either the USFS
or Blaine County.
The Appellants' argument below and here on appeal is that the District Court
should have considered this extrinsic hearsay evidence to assist the Court in interpreting
the Easement of Access. The District Court heard oral argument from Appellants on July
23, 2014 just prior to the trial.
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Appellants argued, for the first time, the layman's term of "permanent" as
opposed to the legal term of "permanent" was different - i.e. there was some ambiguity
as to what "permanent" meant. Transcript of Court's Rulings and Remarks, May 5, 2014,
15:12-16. The Appellants further argued that no easement could be permanent because a
theoretical earthquake could block an easement. Id. at 16: 19-17:4.
The Court heard Appellants' arguments about the withholding of documents and
agreed with Appellants that they were withheld, however, the District Court found, in the
exercise of its discretion, the late production was not prejudicial, because "when Odmark
used the term permanent it doesn't matter what he contemplated or what he intended or
what he thought he might get or what the forest service might do. He used the term
permanent, and to me, permanent means permanent. Doesn't mean permanent for a
while." Id. at 29:13-24.
The Court again reached the identical express legal conclusion it had reached
when ruling two previous occasions: (i) on the cross-motions for summary judgment, and
(ii) on Appellants' Motion to Amend Complaint, wherein the District Court stated:
I don't think my position's changed ... when/if Blaine County and the
United States Forest Service provide a permanent access. So in my view,
and I've ruled on this, the easement that came from the forest service was
not permanent. It is not permanent, and no amount of - I tend to agree
with Mr. Trout here, no amount of discovery of is going to change the face
of [the Woodcock Easement]. And my position hasn't changed from my
permanent - or excuse me, from my previous ruling that the rest of it is all
periphery. What was intended, what was discussed, what people wanted,
whether they were public hearings, what Odmark expected, what Blaine
County thought, that doesn't matter. What happened was the forest
service did not grant a permanent easement. I think that is a matter
oflaw."
Transcript on Appeal, July 23, 2014 29:25-30: 16.
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The District Court again affirmed its earlier decision in the cross-motions for
summary judgment when discussing the admission of the USFS Press Release, PL' s
Exhibit 8, by stating, "Doesn't affect, even if it would have been produced earlier or
obtained earlier, doesn't affect the nature of the easement the forest service granted,
and those determinations the Court made from the face of the easement, not from

what people intended, not from public comment, not from what was solicited or
requested ... the [Woodcock Easement] stands on its own, the easement from the
forest service, and I think its limited from its own terms." Transcript on Appeal, July

23, 2014, 57:3-12.
The District Court further demonstrated it had previously considered the
documents which Appellants argue should have been considered to determine the intent
of the parties to the Easement of Access. The District Court stated at the conclusion of
the trial,
[t]he fact is those are not permanent easements by the forest service,
as a matter of law. I'm not going back on that. I feel fairly firm in that
ruling. Temporary easement is anybody's guess. They all saw something
coming from the forest service which I think they all hoped would solve
their problem. I think it's fairly evident, and one can glean from the intent
in all those documents and things that they all saw something, but what
they got didn't fix the problem, didn't grant permanent access. That was
the word Odmark used. If it's permanent, then I think it would have
solved the problem, but it wasn't, the problem exists."

Transcript on Appeal, July 23, 2014, 126:3-15.

The District Court's denial of the

Appellants' Renewed Motion to Amend Complaint was not an abuse of discretion, as the
amendment would have been, and remains, futile.
c.

The District Court's Ruling, if in error, was Harmless Error.

Even if the District Court's denial of Appellants' Motion to Amend and Renewed
Motion to Amend was in error, it was a harmless error. "In civil cases, I.R.C.P. 61 states
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that unless the error appears inconsistent with substantial
reversal and that

court must disregard

error in the

it is not grounds for

does not

affect the substantial rights of the parties. This Court has also stated that if an error did
not affect a party's substantial rights or the error did not affect the result of the trial, the
error is harmless and not grounds for reversal." Myers v. Workmen's Auto ins. Co .. 140
Idaho 495. 95 P.3d 977 (2004).
Appellant must also show that had the error not occurred "a different result would
have been probable.'· Soria v. Sierra Pacific Airlines, Inc., 111 Idaho 594, 726 P.2d 706
(1986). Appellants have failed to show how the granting of the filing of an Amended
Complaint would have provided for a different outcome.
It is clear from the review of the proceedings below in this matter, the District
Court considered all the evidence placed before it, and the denials on Appellants' Motion
to Amend and Renewed Motion to Amend would not have, and did not affect substantial
rights of the Appellants.

III.

Appellants' Argument that the Easement is Unenforceable and Void
for Lack of an Adequate Legal Description is Raised for the First
Time on Appeal, and Fails as a Matter of Law.

The Court Trial held on July 23, 2014 was limited only to equities as
acknowledged by Appellants' counsel. The Appellants argue that the lack of an adequate
legal description is an "equitable legal principle" which voids the Easement of Access.
Appellants' Brief, p. 21. The Appellants attempted merger of equitable principles and
legal principles in its argument is inappropriate. Furthermore, Appellant asserts the legal
principles applicable to a legal description required in a purchase and sale agreement are
to be applied identically to easement descriptions. Appellant's argument is not supported
by settled principles in Idaho law.
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a.

Equitable Principles are Distinct from Legal Principles.

Equitable principles are "based on a system of rules and principles which
originated in England as an alternative to the harsh rules of common law and which were
based on what was fair in a particular situation. One sought relief under this system in
courts of equity rather than in courts of law. The term "equity" denotes the spirit and
habit of fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate the intercourse of men
with men." Black's Law Dictionary 540 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 6th ed., West 1990)
(citing Gilles v. Department of Human Resources Development, 11 Cal.3d 313, 113
Cal.Rptr. 374, 380, 521 P.2d 110 (1974)).
Meanwhile, legal principles are distinguishable from equity and may be founded
in statutes as passed by the legislature. Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed. defines "Legal"
as:
1. Conforming to the law; according to law; required or permitted by law;
not forbidden or discountenanced by law; good and effectual in law; of or
pertaining to the law; lawful;
2. Proper or sufficient to be recognized by the law; cognizable in the
courts; competent or adequate to fulfill the requirements of the law;
3. Cognizable in courts of law, as distinguished from courts of equity;
construed or governed by the rules and principles of law, in
contradistinction to rules of equity. With the merger in most states of law
and equity courts, this distinction generally no longer exists.;
4. Posited by the courts as the inference or imputation of the law, as a
matter of construction, rather than established by actual proof; e.g., legal
malic; and
5. Created by law.
Black's Law Dictionary 892 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 6th ed., West 1990). As previously
discussed, the District Court's interpretation of the Easement of Access as an
unambiguous document, is a matter oflaw and not equity.
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The trial was limited solely to equitable issues - that is whether the cloud on Lot 7
was equitable or not. The Appellants' argument, now raised for the first time on appeal,
seeks to blur the distinction between the legal principle of interpretation of a document
and the equitable principle of fairness. This blurring argument was neither raised nor
pled before, or during the trial held.
b.

Appellants' Argument is Raised for the First Time on Appeal
and Should Not be Considered.

Appellants raise this legal issue for the first time on appeal. The District Court
below determined, as a matter of law, the intent of the parties as ascertained from the
plain language of the Easement of Access. Appellants did not raise the legal issue of the
statute of frauds, nor did the Appellants raise the legal issue of a valid legal description.
After the District Court determined the intention of the parties as a matter of law
on summary judgment, the District Court limited the trial to one of equity, i.e. what is the
"particular use or harm that's coming to Mr. Kirk other than the possibility, which is the
same possibility Ms. Wescott has, the possibility that at some point in the future, she
needs access across Kirk's lot?" Transcript on Appeal, July 23, 2014, 122:4-9.
Appellants' argument should not be considered because "[t]he longstanding rule
of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are presented for the first time on
appeal." Fernandez v. Aevermann, No. 34089, 2008 WL 9468649, at *2-3 (Idaho Ct.
App. Aug. 12, 2008) (citing Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061, 1062
(1991)). The Court in Fernandez v. Aevermann went on to explain the rationale as first
stated by the Supreme Court of the Territory ofldaho in 1867 as
It is for the protection of inferior courts. It is manifestly unfair for a party
to go into court and slumber, as it were, on [a] defense, take no exception
to the ruling, present no point for the attention of the court, and seek to
present [the] defense, that was never mooted before, to the judgment of the
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appellate court. Such a practice would destroy the purpose of an appeal
and make the supreme court one for deciding questions of law in the first
instance.
Id (citing Smith v. Sterling, 1 Idaho 128, 131 (1867) ).

The Appellants chose to sit on the blurred argument of "equitable legal principle",
which argument was not presented to the District Court. Rather, Appellant now poses it
to the Supreme Court as a newly conceived and newly invented phrase of "equitable legal
principle." The Appellants are asking this Court to decide this legal issue in the first
instance.
The issue of whether the Easement of Access is void for lack of an adequate legal
description was not before the District Court as a legal principle. The Easement of
Access is a written document, and "[t]he legal effect of an unambiguous \vritten
document must be decided by the trial court as a question oflaw.'' lvfachado v. Ryan, 153
Idaho 212,280 P.3d 715 (2012) (internal citations omitted).
This issue of whether the easement is void for lack of an adequate legal
description, or not, would require the District Court to interpret the document applying a
legal standard and not an equitable standard. The Appellants failed to present any
argument to the District Court, prior to the trial on equitable issues, that the Easement of
Access was "void for lack of an adequate legal description" as argued in Appellants'
Brief.
This fusion of "equitable legal principle" issue appears for the first time in
Appellant's opening Brief. The new argument is triggered only by Appellant Mr. Kirk's
testimony as a layperson with no expertise in easements at a trial held to determine the
equitable issues.

-27-

Appellants now seek to use this testimony, admitted by the District Court solely
for consideration of equitable principles, to support an argument based purely upon legal
principles which were neither raised prior to the trial nor by a motion for reconsideration.
Appellants' argument should not be considered as being raised for the first time on
appeal.
c.

The Easement of Access is Not Void for Lack of an Adequate
Legal Description

The Court must determine whether the Easement of Access meets the rule as
stated by this Court in Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243, 270 P.2d 825 (1954). Each of
Appellants' cases cited in support of their legal argument relates to a purchase and sale
agreement with regards to the purchase or prospective purchase of property.

The

Appellants' recitation to cases which discuss a legal description contained within a
purchase and sale agreement is inapplicable to the matter at hand.
A simple review of the legal principles applicable to legal descriptions in a
purchase and sale agreement as contrasted with the legal principles applicable to
descriptions within easements reveals that well settled Idaho law has two distinctly
different standards.
In Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243, 270 P.2d 825 (1954), the Idaho Supreme Court
adopted the general rule as stated in Inge/son v. Olson, 199 Minn. 422, 272 N.W. 270
(1937) with respect to easement descriptions as follows, "[i]n describing an easement, all
that is required is a description which identifies the land which is the subject of the
easement, and expresses the intention of the parties." The Idaho Supreme Court has
reaffirmed the rule as stated in Quinn v. Stone, in 1992 in Phillips Industries, Inc. v.
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Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 827 P.2d 706 (1992), and as late as 2012 in Machado v. Ryan,

153 Idaho 212,280 P.3 715 (2012).
In Quinn v. Stone, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed testimony from two
civil engineers who had examined the descriptions of the ditches and were specifically
asked to opine as to whether or not they could establish the ditches. Both engineers
affirmatively represented they could establish the ditches based upon the descriptions
provided. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the District Court's judgment, which found
the appellants had abandoned the easement and that they had exhausted their rights under
the easement, and remanded with instructions to "determine, and definitely described, the
course and distance of the present north easterly ditch, and the second ditch West and
then north to be constructed; the right-of-way for ingress and egress and the power line."
Quinn v. Stone, supra.

The Idaho Supreme Court further stated the rule with respect to easements in
Idaho, "where conveyance of the right-of-way does not definitely fix its location, the
grantee is entitled to a convenient, reasonable, and accessible way within the limits
of the grant." Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243 (1954) (citing 28 C.J.S., Easements,§ 80a,

page 760) (emphasis added).
In Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Forrest Weaver Farm, Inc., l 03 Idaho 180, 646
P.2d 422 (1983), the Idaho Supreme Court further affirmed the rule adopted in the State
of Idaho, stating, "Although the contract does not specify the exact location of additional
pipelines, Northwest's choice of route is limited by the rule '(w)here a conveyance of a
right of way does not definitely fix its location, the grantee is entitled to a convenient,
reasonable, and accessible way within the limits of the grant.'
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In light of these

authorities, the multiple line grant cannot be~ held void for want of definiteness." 103
Idaho 180, 182, 646 P .2d 422, 424 (1982) (emphasis added).
Here, the grant of the Easement of Access clearly identifies the land which is the
subject of the easement, that is a "25 foot wide Easement of Access ... over the Southeast
corner of Lot 7 of Block 1 of the Glassford Heights Sub[division]." R. Vol. I., p. 13. The
grant of the Easement of Access goes on to describe the intention of the parties as being
" ... for access to Lot 8 of the Glassford Heights Sub[division]." Id The description is
adequate and is not void for lack of an adequate legal description.

IV.

The District Court Properly Interpreted the Easement.

Appellants argue the Easement of Access should be quitclaimed back to Lot 7
because it never came into effect, or in other words, there was no need for it and therefore
it somehow expired. As discussed above in Section I supra regarding the District Court's
granting of summary judgment to Respondent, the District Court never found the
Easement of Access to be ambiguous. As a result, the District Court correctly determined
the intention of the parties as a matter oflaw as ascertained from the Easement of Access'
plain language and without the aid of extrinsic evidence. The District Court correctly
followed the rule as affirmed in Hoch v. Vance, 155 Idaho 636, 315 P.3d 824 (Idaho
2013).
Appellants then argue there is a condition precedent to the Easement of Access
from being granted to Lot 8 - that is the Easement of Access does not exist unless certain
conditions exist. This argument is simply incorrect, because the Warranty Deed states:
For Value Received Leif Odmark, sole and separate property
Hereinafter called the Grantor, hereby grants, bargains, sells and conveys
unto
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James A McElveen and Ann B. McElveen, husband and wife
whose address is: PO Box 3110, Sun Valley, ID 83353
Hereinafter called the Grantee, the following described premises situated
in Blaine County, ID to-wit:
Lot 8 in Block 1 of GLASSFORD HEIGHTS SUBDIVSION, according
to the official plat thereof, recorded as Instrument No. 115702, records of
Blaine County, Idaho.
Together with a temporary Easement of Access described in the attached
Exhibit 1.
R. Vol. I, p. 12.

Ms. Wescott didn't just receive the second paragraph of the Easement of Access,
but received the Easement of Access in its entirety.
The Easement of Access can be separated into two clauses: Paragraph 1 and
Paragraph 2. Paragraph 1 calls for receipt of permanent access from either Blaine County
or the USFS across USFS lands to Lot 8. Within thirty days after receiving permanent
access, Lot 8 must quitclaim the Easement of Access back to Lot 7. Ms. Wescott has not
received permanent access, so no duty arises under Paragraph 1.
Paragraph 2 of the Easement of Access describes when the Easement of Access
becomes effective, or like a light bulb, turned on. Until the owner of Lot 8 receives a
written denial of access from the USFS, the Easement of Access is not effective, or is off.
However, upon receipt of a written denial, the Easement of Access is turned on. Lot 8
may then access the property across the Easement of Access until Blaine County agrees
to allow access to Lot 8 from Jones Lane. After the completion of a driveway from Jones
Lane to Lot 8, Lot 8 must then quitclaim the Easement of Access to Lot 7. As found by
the District Court, access from Blaine County is no longer legally possible, due to the
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action of Appellant's predecessor in interest having sought, and obtained, a vacation of
Jones Lane by the County.
As the Appellants urged the District Court, the Appellants now urge this Court to
focus solely on the second paragraph of the Easement of Access. If the Court were to
focus only on the second paragraph of the Easement of Access, the Court would reach the
same conclusion, and that is that the Easement of Access is valid, has not expired, and is
still available to Ms. Wescott in the event she receives written denial from the USPS.
The second paragraph states, in its entirety:
This Easement of Access shall become "In Effect" only upon receipt by
the owner (of Lot 8) of written denial by the USPS for the owner (of Lot
8) to access Lot 8 across USPS lands on the East side of the property line
(of Lot 8) and beginning at Bench Road. This Easement of Access shall
remain "In Effect" only until Blaine County agrees to allow access to Lot
8 from Jones Lane. The owner's of Lot 8 shall Quitclaim the Easement of
Access back to Lot 7 within one year or upon completion of the driveway,
whichever occurs first.
R. Vol. I, p. 13.

In order to properly interpret the Easement of Access, the Court must review the
Easement of Access in its entirety. However, after interpreting the first paragraph and
determining Ms. Wescott's 2007 Easement from the USPS is not permanent, nor is the
Woodcock Easement, an interpretation of the second paragraph simply describes when
the easement becomes effective, and the duties after the easement becomes effective, or
turned on.
As acknowledged by the Appellants - the Easement of Access is either on or off.
Appellants' Brief, p. 26. In order for the Easement of Access to turn "on," Ms. Wescott
must receive a written denial of access from the USPS, otherwise the Easement of Access
is "off." In other words, the Easement of Access is currently not necessary for use.
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However as recognized by the District Court, there is no guaranty that at some
point in the future, Ms. Wescott or some future owner of Lot 8, won't receive a written
denial from the USFS denying access across USFS lands. Simply because the Easement
of Access is not currently necessary for use, does not mean that Ms. Wescott, or a
successor in interest, does not have a valid easement. See Ko/ouch v. Kramer, 120 Idaho
65, 813 P.2d 876 (1991) ("[W]here an easement has been created but no occasion has
arisen for its use, the owner of the servient tenement may fence his land and such use will
not be deemed adverse to the existence of the easement until such time as (1) the need for
the right of way arises, (2) a demand is made by the owner of the dominant tenement that
the easement be opened and (3) the owner of the servient tenement refuses to do so.")
The second sentence of the second paragraph of the Easement of Access goes on
to provide how long the Easement of Access will remain "on" or "in effect." "This
Easement of Access shall remain "In Effect" only until Blaine County agrees to allow
access to Lot 8 from Jones Lane." R. Vol. I, p. 13. As the Appellants pointed out, Blaine
County vacated Jones Lane at the request of the Appellants' predecessor in interest.
Given the vacation by Blaine County, if the Easement of Access becomes "in effect" or
"on," the Easement of Access must remain on or "in effect" perpetually.
Finally, Appellants point to the last sentence of the second paragraph of the
Easement of Access which requires Lot 8 to quitclaim the Easement of Access within one
year, or upon the completion of the driveway. Appellants' argue that because (i) it has
been more than one year since the Easement of Access was granted to Ms. Wescott and
(ii) Ms. Wescott's driveway connects to the forest road easement, the Easement of
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Access is no longer valid. Appellant's Brief, p. 27. The District Court considered these
exact arguments below and addressed them as discussed in Section I supra.
However, the last sentence of the second paragraph, when read in concert with the
entirety of the Easement of Access, in particular the second paragraph, is exclusive of the
USFS Easement, and suggests the Easement of Access to be quitclaimed within one year
after the Easement of Access becomes active.
Next, Appellants focus on the phrase "or upon completion of the driveway"
contained in the last sentence of the second paragraph. Appellants cite to the fact that
Ms. Wescott has a circular driveway that connects to the USFS Easement. Appellants'
Brief, p. 27. Appellants asked the District Court below, and this Court, to make a finding
or an assumption that the "driveway" discussed is the current driveway. The Appellants'
argument regarding the driveway fails based upon the facts as presented to the District
Court in the Appellants' Motion to Amend and Renewed Motion to Amend. The address
of Respondent's property was originally 105 Jones Lane. R. Vol. I, p. 13.
It is nothing more than an assumption by the Appellants that the driveway
contemplated in the Easement of Access exits onto the USFS Easement. Appellants fail
to represent to the Court that the original plat of the subdivision provided for access to
Lot 8 via Jones Lane. The driveway contemplated was from Jones Lane through the
wetlands, and connecting to State Highway 75. R. Vol. I, p. 90.
Likewise, the Appellants ignore the entire third sentence which states that the
Easement of Access remains "in effect" until Blaine County allows access from Jones
Lane to Lot 8. The District Court did not make the finding that the Easement of Access,
nor Ms. Wescott's Warranty Deed was ambiguous.
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Simply because Appellants'

interpretation is different than that of the District Court's interpretation, does not mean
the District Court erred. The District Court properly determined the intent of the parties
from the plain language of the document and without considering extrinsic evidence, all
according to law.

V.

The District Court Abused its Discretion When it Determined
Appellants Had Not Pursued the Case Frivolously.
a.

Respondent's Cross-Appeal was Timely.

Appellant argues Respondent's Cross-Appeal was untimely. Appellant's Brief,
pp. 27-29. In order to determine whether Respondent's Cross-Appeal was timely filed,
the Court must consider the timeline of events.
August 25, 2015
September 3, 2015
October 27, 2015
November 3, 2015
November 13, 2015
November 13, 2015
January 26, 2015
February 23, 2015
March 3, 2015

Judgment Entered
Respondent files Memorandum of Fees and Costs
Hearing on Memorandum of Fees & Costs and Appellants'
Motion to Disallow Fees & Costs
Amended Judgment entered
Appellants file Amended Notice of Appeal
Respondent files Motion to Reconsider Fees & Costs
pursuant to Rule l l(a)(2)(B) of the I.R.C.P.
Court denies Respondent's Motion to Reconsider Fees &
Costs
Appellant Files Notice of Cross Appeal
Appellant files Amended Notice of Cross Appeal

Rule 15(b) of the Idaho Appellate Rules states,
A cross-appeal, as a matter of right, may be made only by physically filing
the notice of cross-appeal with the clerk of the district court or
administrative agency within the 42 day time limit prescribed in Rule 14,
as it applies to the judgment or order from which the cross-appeal is taken,
or within 21 days after the date of filing of the original notice of appeal,
whichever is later.
Rule 14 of the Idaho Appellate Rules states:

(a) Appeals From the District Court. Any appeal as a matter of right
from the district court may be made only by physically filing a notice of
appeal with the clerk of the district court within 42 days from the date
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evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of the court on any judgment or
order of the district court appealable as a matter of right in any civil or
criminal action. The time for an appeal from any civil judgment or order in
an action is terminated by the filing of a timely motion which, if granted,
could affect any findings of fact, conclusions of law or any judgment in
the action (except motions under Rule 60 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure or motions regarding costs or attorney's fees), in which case the
appeal period for all judgments or orders commences to run upon the date
of the clerk's filing stamp on the order deciding such motion.
The District Court denied Respondent's request for attorney's fees on October 27,
2015, finding the case was not brought frivolously. Appellant argues that the 42 days
begins running from the entry of the Court's Amended Judgment on November 3, 2014.
In support of this argument, Appellant relies on Rule 14 of the Idaho Appellate Rule
which states "which, if granted, could affect any findings of fact, conclusions of law or
any judgment in the action (except motions ... regarding costs or attorneys fees)."
Respondent isn't appealing from the Judgment entered which dismisses the
Appellants' Complaint.

Respondent is appealing from the District Court's denial of

Respondent's attorney's fees.

The District Court's order denying Respondent's

attorney's fees were entered on November 3, 2014. This Order was entered after final
judgment was entered in this matter. On November 13, 2014, just 10 days after the entry
of the Court's Order, Respondent filed her motion for reconsideration, citing to Rule
l l(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
(B) Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration of any
interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the
entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen ( 14) days after the entry
of the final judgment. A motion for reconsideration of any order of the
trial court made after entry of final judgment may be filed within
fourteen (14) days from the entry of such order; provided, there shall
be no motion for reconsideration of an order of the trial court entered on
any motion filed under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 59(e), 59J, 60(a),
or 60(b).
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I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Respondent's motion, was as to an order made
after final judgment, as defined by Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(a)(7). Respondent's Motion
for Reconsideration was a motion which "if granted, could affect any findings of fact,
conclusions of law or any judgment in the action" as required by Idaho Appellate Rule
14.
Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration asked the District Court to reconsider
its finding that the Appellant had not pursued the case in violation of Idaho Statute § 12121. R. Vol. II., p. 58-64. If the District Court were to grant Respondent's motion, it
would have affected the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the judgment in this
matter, and then the District Court would have had to consider what fees were
appropriate to award to Respondent.
The District Court heard Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration on January 26,
2015 and orally denied Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration the same day. 1 The
day the Court entered the order denying Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration,
begins the running of the 42 day deadline. I.A.R. 14(a). The deadline for Respondent to
file her notice of appeal was March 9, 2015. Respondent filed her notice of cross-appeal
on February 23, 2015 and her Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal on March 3, 2015, well
within the timeline as set forth in I.A.R. 14(a) and I.A.R. 15.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear Ms. Wescott's appeal.

1

It is important to note, that even though Respondent requested a transcript of the

January 26, 2015 hearing, one was not provided with the Record. Respondent is
contemporaneously filing a Motion to Augment the Record to include the January 26,
2015 hearing transcript.
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b.

Appellants' Case Was Brought and Pursued Frivolously.

Appellants' cause of action below revolved around a single, simple question: Was
the 2007 USFS Easement to Ms. Wescott permanent, or not? A detailed review of
Appellants' Complaint clearly sets the stage for this question:
10.
On May 15, 2007, the U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest
Service conveyed to Defendant Ann B. Wescott a 33' wide easement to
access the Dominant Estate (the "Replacement Easement"). A true and
correct copy of the Replacement Easement is attached hereto as Exhibit
"Be"
11.
The Replacement Easement was intended to replace the Temporary
Access Easement.
12.
On or about January 11, 2010 the Plaintiffs acquired title to the
Servient Estate.
13.

The Temporary Access Easement expressly provides that the owner of the

Dominant Estate will quitclaim the Temporary Access Easement back to the
owner of the Servient Estate within thirty (30) days o f receipt of the Replacement
Easement.
14.
Notwithstanding any other provision contained in the Temporary
Access Easement, the express language of the Temporary Access
Easement provides that, "The owner's of Lot 8 (the Dominant Estate) shall
Quitclaim the Easement of Access back to Lot 7 (the Servient Estate)
within one year or upon completion of the driveway, whichever comes
first".

15.
Notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. Forest Service has conveyed
the Replacement Easement to the Defendants and that it has been more
than one year from the date the Temporary Access Easement was granted,
Defendants have failed and refused to quitclaim the Temporary Access
Easement to the owner of the Servient Estate.
16.
Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment qmetmg title that the
Temporary Access Easement is expired, void, terminated, and is no longer
an encumbrance on the Plaintiffs' property.
R. Vol. I., pp. 10-11. Appellants' entire Complaint was based upon the false assertion
that the 2007 Easement from the USFS to Ms. Wescott was "permanent."
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There was neither a factual nor legal basis for Appellants' Complaint, and as such
the action was, and remains, frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation under Rule
54(e)(l) and Idaho Code§ 12-121.
The District Court abused its discretion when it denied Respondent's request for
attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121. "An award of attorney fees pursuant to J.C. §
12-121 is discretionary and is subject to review and vacation only upon a showing of an
abuse of discretion. See Zaleha v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, Chtd., 131 Idaho 254,
257, 953 P.2d 1363, 1366 (1998); Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users Ass 'n v. Pulley, 125
Idaho 237, 250, 869 P.2d 554, 567 (1993). Section 12-121 provides in part: "In any civil
action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party .... "
However, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) limits the discretion of the court to award attorney fees under
this section by providing that "attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be
awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Mocaby, 133 Idaho 593,600, 990 P.2d 1204, 1211 (1999).

First, the District Court erred by not determining Ms. Wescott was the prevailing
party. To determine the prevailing party, the District Court simply needed to look at the
request by the Appellants as stated in their Complaint:
a.
That this Court enter a final Decree and Order declaring the
termination of the Temporary Access Easement and otherwise quieting
Plaintiffs' title to the Temporary Access Easement and the whole of the
Servient Estate.
b.
For an award of costs and reasonable attorney fees against any
Defendant who answer and unsuccessfully defends against the relief
sought by the Plaintiff.
c.

For other and further relief as the Court shall deem equitable.
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R. Vol. I., p. 11.

Judgment was entered as against the Appellants, dismissing their

unfounded claims with prejudice. R. Vol. I., pp. 293-294. The District Court abused its
discretion when it did not find Ms. Wescott was the prevailing party.
Next, the Court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Wescott's request for
fees outright. Appellants brought this action on the sole basis that Ms. Wescott's 2007
Easement from the USFS was to be the "permanent" easement that replaced the
Easement of Access across their property.

However, in so alleging and arguing,

Appellants disregarded the plain and, as admitted by the Appellants on summary
judgment, unambiguous terms of the Easement of Access. Paragraph 1 of the Easement
of Access required "permanent access across USFS Lands to Lot 8" prior to Lot 8 being
required to quitclaim the Easement of Access back to Lot 7.
Appellants' contention, as stated in the Complaint, never held any factual or legal
validity. The 2007 Easement from the USFS is not "permanent", by any definition. The
2007 Easement has a specific expiration date, plainly stated, on the face of the
instrument.
The specific facts of this case are distinguishable from the specific facts of the

Bear Island Water Ass'n v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717,874 P.2d 528 (1994), case, though the
underlying reasoning is indistinguishable.

In Bear Island, the Bear Island Water

Association ("BIW A"), asserted both at the trial court and at the appellate court, that the
well was connected to the water system and in use at the time of conveyance to Jefferson
County. The well wasn't operational until November of 1988, more than a year after Lot
9 was conveyed to Jefferson County.
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The Supreme Court found that BIWA's factual assertion, which was essential to
BIWA's easement claim "was clearly incorrect, and to pursue an appeal of the easement
issue in reliance on this incorrect factual assertion was frivolous and unreasonable.
Without this erroneous representation of the facts, BIWA's arguments for easement rights
were clearly without foundation." Id.
Similar to Shettel v. Bamesberger, 130 Idaho 217, 938 P.2d 1255 (Ct. App. 1997),
the Appellants' pleadings and testimony were inconsistent. Appellant's pled that the
USFS Easement was permanent. Of equal import, Appellants' factual assertion that Ms.
Wescott's 2007 Easement from the USFS was intended to replace the Easement of
Access was never factually correct, and wholly unsupported by any documentary or
testimonial evidence. Appellant's contention was frivolous and unreasonable, and the
District Court erred when it denied Respondent her attorney's fees.
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL

Respondent/Cross-Appellant is entitled to her attorney's fees on appeal, because
Appellants have pursued this appeal frivolously and unreasonably.

In Shettel v.

Bamesberger, 130 Idaho 217, 938 P.2d 1255 (Ct. App. 1997), the Magistrate Court, after

the case having been remanded from the District Court, determined that Bamesberger
acted unreasonably throughout the pretrial proceedings and discovery. The magistrate
court also determined the Bamesbergers failed to present any evidence adequate to
support their equitable doctrine claims.
"An award of attorney fees for pursuit of an appeal is appropriate where the
appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation. An appeal should do more than simply invite the appellate court to second
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guess a trial court on conflicting evidence." Shettel v. Bamesberger, 130 Idaho 217, 222,
938 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Ct. App. 1997) (internal citations omitted).
The Appellants in this matter are simply inviting the Supreme Court to second
guess the District Court's rulings where there was no legal or factual foundation to
support the filing of the Complaint. Appellants, excepting for a legal argument raised on
the first time on appeal, are simply asking this Court to reinterpret the same evidence as
presented to the District Court.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Respondent requests this Court affirm the District
Court's decision dismissing Appellants' Complaint, and reverse the District Court's
decision denying Respondent's attorney's fees below. Respondent further requests this
Court grant Respondent attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121.
DATED: February 2, 2016
TROUT LAW, PLLC

Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 2, 2016, a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing document was forwarded addressed as follows in the manner stated
below:
Hand Delivered
U.S. Mail
Fax

Jed W. Manwaring, ISB No. 3040
Christy A. Kaes, ISB No. 4852
EV ANS KEANE, LLP
1161 West River Street, Ste. 100
P.O. Box 959
Boise, ID 83701-0959

Kim J. Trout
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